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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports have become a national obsession1 and the sports
entertainment industry has flourished into big business in the United States.2
Superstar athletes demand salaries of over $100 million3 and, as a result, have
reached celebrity status.4 This status brings with it the public’s demand for
performance at the highest level and the physical sacrifice associated with a win-atall-costs attitude.5 Sports reports and game summaries are incomplete without
coverage of an injured athlete forfeiting his body for the team and his fans, or
overcoming some painful injury for the love of the game.6
Injuries are a substantial part of any professional sport and require treatment from
qualified personnel. Most professional sports teams are contractually bound to
1
Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 HOUS. L.
REV. 657, 657 (1981) (Stating that sports, athletics, and physical fitness have grown into a
national obsession); see also, James H. Davis, “Fixing” the Standard of Care: Motivated
Athletes and Medical Practice, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 220 (1998) (stating that athletes
are an essential part of modern social culture).
2

See generally, ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, 2 LAW
SPORTS INDUSTRIES 14 (2d ed. 1993).

AND

BUSINESS

OF THE

3
In December 2000, free-agent shortstop, Alex Rodriguez signed a guaranteed Major
League Baseball contract with the Texas Rangers for $252 million. See Tom Verducci,
Powerball: Alex Rodriguez Hit the Jackpot When the Rangers Offered Him $252 Million and
the City of Texas, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 2000, at 102. Shortstop Derek Jeter recently
signed a ten-year, $189 million contract with the New York Yankees. See Anthony
McCarron, Jeter’s Jillions Put Yanks on Defensive Champs but Not in Payroll, DAILY NEWS
(New York), Feb. 10, 2001, at 51. Los Angeles Lakers star, Shaquille O’neal is currently
playing out a seven-year contract worth $120 million. See Rachel Blount, Shaquille O’neal’s
Impending Debut With the Los Angeles Lakers - at a Cost of$120 Million – is Sending Shock
Waves Through an NBA City Starved for a Superstar, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 29,
1996, at 4C.
4

See Davis, supra note 1, at 221.

5

Id.

6

Id.
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provide their athletes with medical care. Many teams employ the services of medical
doctors in order to fulfill this requirement.7 The relationship between the team
physician and the professional athlete [hereinafter athlete] differs from the typical
doctor-patient relationship, and can result in less than competent treatment wherein
the athlete’s best interests are sacrificed.8
Team management, the coaching staff, the public, and the players themselves all
demand a winning team. In pursuing the ultimate goal of a championship, athletes
undoubtedly compromise their health for the good of the team. Pressures on the
athlete to play while injured or on a team physician to withhold medical information
from an athlete are constantly present. As a result, athletes frequently play through
pain and injury. All too often, athletes compete without full knowledge of the
associated risks of permanent physical disability.9
Examples of athletes succumbing to the pressures exerted on them are abundant.
Mike Robitaille, a professional hockey player in the National Hockey League (NHL)
was sidelined with a shoulder injury and threatened with suspension if he didn’t
begin playing.10 His coach, Phillip Maloney commented:
Of course we [Robitaille’s team, the Vancouver Canucks] were short a
defenceman with Robitaille out (sore shoulder). I don’t know exactly
how bad it is but I tell you he’d better start playing. If he doesn’t, I’m
going to have to consider suspending him. I’ll have a talk with him about
it.11
At the demand of his coach and the advice of team physicians and the team trainer,
Robitaille suffered severe injuries and endured excruciating pain in order to continue
to play hockey and maintain his employment.12 The injuries Robitaille experienced
ultimately ended his professional hockey career and left him permanently disabled.13
Robitaille eventually recovered against his club through a negligence claim for
failing to act reasonably to ensure his fitness, health, and safety.14
Similarly, basketball great, Bill Walton, was plagued with injuries throughout
much of his career, but conceded to pressure to continue playing.15 In order to play
through pain, Walton reluctantly accepted injections and other pain numbing

7
See generally, GARY A. UBERSTINE, 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR SPORTS 14 A
24-25 (2000). See also infra note 41.
8

See generally, id. at 14 A 2-3.

9

See infra, note 12, 15, 18.

10

Robitaille v.Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., 124 D.L. R. (3d) 228, 230 (1981).

11

Id.

12

See generally id.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 233.

15

Twila Keim, Physicians for Professional Sports Teams: Health Care Under the Pressure
of Economic and Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 196, 219 (1999), citing
Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

3

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

510

[Vol. 49:507

medication for several years.16 Walton eventually settled a lawsuit against his former
team, the Portland Trailblaizers. However, he currently suffers from permanent
injuries as a result of receiving numerous Novicaine and cortisone injections during
his short professional career.17
Former National Football League (NFL) standouts, Charles Krueger and Dick
Butkus sued their respective teams, alleging that the team and team physicians failed
to disclose the nature and extent of their injuries and failed to inform them of the
risks associated with painkilling treatments.18 More and more professional athletes
are seeking redress for alleged mistreatment by professional sports franchises, and
the medical doctors they employ, through the legal system.19 The major professional
leagues20 and professional sports teams have responded by creating a system in
which both teams and team physicians escape personal liability.21
This note discusses the role of the team physician and the unique conflicts he or
she faces when providing medical care to athletes. In particular, the note describes
the pressure team doctors experience from team management, the coaching staff, and
the players themselves.22 Next, the note discusses the types of claims professional
athletes have brought against their doctors and team employers and how the terms of
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) and workers’ compensation laws create
obstacles to their recovery. The note will explore the need for a specialized legal
standard within the practice of sports medicine and identify the disincentive for
sports physicians to act professionally in the absence of a heightened standard of
care. The final section of the note offers solutions to address the conflicts team
physicians face. Recommendations include establishing a more definite and
predictable legal standard of care for application to sports medicine practitioners,
creating an alternative application of state workers’ compensation laws to the
professional sports workplace, and amending the CBAs currently governing major
professional sports.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

See Kruger v. San Francisco Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See
also BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 510.
19
See e.g., Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579; Robitalle, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 228; Martin v.
Casagrande, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1990); DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663
F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
20

The major professional sports leagues in America are the National Hockey League
(NHL), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and
Major League Baseball (MLB). See generally Kenneth Shouler, After the Fall, CIGAR
AFICIONADO (2001).
21

See generally, WEISTART & LOWELL, infra note 29.

22

See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 3.
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II. TEAM PHYSICIANS
A. Team Physician Defined
Currently no uniform definition of a team physician exists because of the varied
practitioners in the field, and the multitude of diverse relationships physicians may
have with teams.23 For the purposes of this note, however, a team physician is
defined as any doctor who performs professional medical services to athletes that are
either arranged for or paid for, at least in part, by an institution or entity other than
the athlete or his or her insurance company.24 This doctor-athlete relationship
represents a departure from the typical doctor-patient relationship because the person
receiving the treatment is distinct from the person or entity paying for the services.25
B. Physician’s Contractual Responsibilities and Legal Duties
A team physician’s duties are usually well defined in an employment contract
with the professional franchise.26 A typical professional team physician may be
responsible for any or all of the following in the course of his or her employment:
diagnosis and treatment of injuries, arranging for or performing surgical procedures,
regulating physical fitness regiments and dietary plans, referrals to specialists,
designing and overseeing rehabilitation programs, and making medical clearance
decisions.27
In addition to the duties created by a physician’s employment agreement, team
doctors owe legal duties to the athletes they treat. The typical doctor-patient
situation is a consensual relationship between physician and patient.28 The doctor
has fiduciary obligations toward his or her patient.29 Although the doctor-athlete
relationship is distinguishable, it is generally accepted that a team physician owes an
athlete the same fiduciary duties,30 at least in situations where the doctor is rendering

23

See King, supra note 1, at 658.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

See UBERSTINE, supra note 2, at 14 A 24. See also Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968
P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (where a professional team physician signed an employment
contract specifically identifying his duties and responsibilities to the team.).
27

See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 3.

28

See generally id. at ch.14 A.

29

JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 988 (1979) citing
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
30

The nature of these fiduciary duties center on the notion that the doctor is to provide
treatment governed by the patient’s best interests. Id. at 990.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

5

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

512

[Vol. 49:507

therapeutic treatment directly to the athlete.31 The doctor’s fiduciary relationship
with a patient-athlete is governed and evaluated by general tort law principles.32
A physician owes his or her patient a duty of competent treatment dictated by the
patient’s best interests, and a duty to not expose a patient to any unreasonable risk of
harm.33 The standard of care applicable to a general practitioner of medicine is
measured according to the common skill and competence of a member of the
medical profession in good standing.34 Furthermore, when a professional holds him
or herself out as a specialist, the applicable standard is the reasonable conduct of a
member of that particular specialty.35 Although these principles are well-defined and
accepted throughout the modern legal system, their application to sports medicine
practitioners has resulted in a less than clear standard.36 Some courts have been
reluctant to impose a higher standard to sports medicine specialists37 because there
are no established standards for qualification as a sports medicine practitioner.38
Currently, the American Medical Association (AMA) does not recognize sports
medicine as a sub-specialty.39
Many malpractice lawsuits against team physicians settle out of court before
reaching final adjudication.40 Thus, there are relatively few cases delineating the
legal standard by which a team physician is evaluated. One court has recognized a
higher duty applicable to the practice of sports medicine.41 However, this case seems
to be an exception. The legal system’s concern with uniformity of legal standards,42
and the lack of recognition of sports medicine as a specialty by the AMA has
31
Id. at 991, citing Hoffman v. Rogers, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that
a doctor-patient relationship exists between employer and doctor hired by employer giving rise
to fiduciary obligations).
32
See King, supra note 1, at 663-65 (stating that regardless who hires a team physician,
there exists a duty to an examinee or patient athlete not to inflict injury by misfeasance and
that a broad duty to act with due care exists once a doctor begins to render aid). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) [Hereinafter RESTATEMENT 2d].
33
See Matthew J. Mitten, Annotation, Medical Malpractice Liability of Sports Medicine
Care Providers for Injury to, or Death of, Athlete, 33 A.L.R. 5th 619 (1999).
34

See Keim, supra note 15, at 200. See also RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 32, at § 282
(defining negligence as unreasonable conduct exposing others to unreasonable risk of harm).
35

The requisite standard of care applicable to members of a specialty is the skill and
competence of a member of that particular trade or specialty in good standing. RESTATEMENT
2d, supra note 30, at § 299 A.
36

Id.

37

See Rosensweig v. State, 158 N.E.2d 229, 237 (N.Y. 1959) (scrutinizing a ringside
doctor’s conduct in examining and clearing a boxer to fight pursuant to a standard of care
imposed on a general medical practitioner).
38

See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 4.

39

Id.

40

See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 510 n.12-14.

41

See generally Fleischmann v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 216 (La. Ct. App. 1985).

42

See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 510 n.12-14.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/15

6

2001]

EXPLOITING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

513

resulted in uncertainty with respect to the standard of care applicable to physicians
practicing sports medicine. It is unclear whether a team physician, providing
medical care as a practitioner of sports medicine, is held to a higher standard than
that of a general practitioner. This ambiguity inhibits the imposition of incentives
for physicians, holding themselves out as sports medicine specialists, to administer
treatment in accord with an elevated standard of care associated with professional
sub-specialties.
Despite the lack of recognition by the AMA, sports medicine as a specialty is
gaining acceptance throughout the medical community. For example, the American
Osteopathic Association offers certification for physicians practicing or
contemplating the practice of sports medicine.43 Prior to 1970, there were few
medical publications concerning sports medicine. Today, that number has increased
dramatically.44 The Professional Team Physicians Organization, of whom over
eighty percent are professional team physicians, provides descriptions of injuries and
their prevention online.45 The study of sports medicine continues to produce data
compilations as the area of practice grows.46
C. Conflicts Facing Team Physicians Compromise Independence
of Medical Judgment
The role of a team physician differs from ordinary physicians treating private
patients. Normally, the doctor is a considered team employee and receives
compensation from the team itself as opposed to receiving payment from the patient
or the patient’s insurance company. Numerous conflicts of interests arise from this
arrangement. A team physician must constantly decide whose interests to serve: the
athlete as his or her patient, or the team as his or her employer.47 The team physician
has two masters to serve in executing his or her professional judgment.48 The

43

Id. Moreover, a doctor certified by the American Board of Emergency Medicine,
Internal Medicine, Family practice, or Pediatrics may earn a Certificate of Added
Qualification in sports medicine by passing a written exam or by serving a one-year fellowship
offered by various clinics; see also Charles V. Russell, Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising
From Team Physician’s Dual Obligations to the Athlete and Management, 10 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 299, 299 n.2 (1987) (stating that there are currently over 400 sports medicine clinics
in operation in the United States); See also Sigmund J. Solares, Preventing Medical
Malpractice of Team Physicians in Professional Sports: A Call for the Players Unions to Hire
the Team Physicians in Professional Sports, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 235, 238 (1997) (stating that
there are approximately 3,800 medical doctors in the American College of Sports Medicine).
44
See Russell, supra note 43, at 300 (recognizing the following resources: AM. J. SP. MED.,
J. SP. MED & PHYSICAL FITNESS, PHYSICIAN’S SP. MED. SCIENCE & SP., and MED. SCIENCE SP.
& EXERCISE).
45

See Shouler, supra note 20, at 85 (stating that physicians from the Professional Team
Physicians Organization made up of physicians from the NHL, NFL, NBA, MLB, and
Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) maintain a web site at
http://www.sportcare.com).
46

See supra text accompanying note 43, at 300.

47

See Davis, supra note 1, at 223.

48

See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 505.
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interests of the team management, the athlete, the coach, and the doctor may all
conflict in ways that can physically harm athletes.
1. Pressures from Team Management/Employer
Team management controls the team physician’s employment and exerts pressure
on the doctor. This pressure may ultimately compromise his or her medical
judgment and compel him or her to sacrifice the best interests of athletes.49 For
example, team management may pressure a physician to clear an athlete for
competition before he is physically ready, conceal the true extent of an athlete’s
condition or injury,50 or prescribe a “quick fix” in derogation of reasonable medical
practices.51 Obviously, these decisions may compromise the long-term health of the
professional athlete.
Sports entertainment is a business like any other, and management is responsible
for making its franchise profitable. Increasing ticket sales, acquiring television
coverage, and selling team merchandise accomplish this goal. The most effective
way to increase profitability is by winning games, and ultimately, a championship.
In order to win games, a team must field its best players, and the need to maximize
the immediate potential of athletes is paramount. Accordingly, team management
may be willing to jeopardize the health of its players in order to realize immediate
financial success.52 Former Los Angeles Raider Lester Hayes said,
The team doctors are trying to tell me that all of this is in my head. That’s
the way they operate in the NFL when a guy gets injured. It’s a powerful
psychological stimuli. I’ve seen guys who are so hurt that they can barely
move, but the team doctors try to browbeat them with good feelings. I
call it Psychological B.S. 101. They tell you, “Everything’s fine. You’re
much better. Nothing’s wrong with you.” They get you so psyched up
that you’ll play, even though you shouldn’t be out there. It happens all
the time.53
It is evident that some professional athletes mistrust team doctors with mistrust
because they feel that the physicians are accountable to management and not the
athletes. A professional team management’s control over the team physician’s
employment subjects him or her to pressure which may operate to compromise his or
her medical judgment.
2. Pressures from Coaching Staff
Professional coaches may influence team physicians to compromise an athlete’s
health in an effort to win games. A professional coach’s success ultimately depends
upon his or her winning percentage, or team management’s assessment of his or her
49

See King, supra note 1, at 698; see also Solares, supra note 43, at 140.

50

See generally Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 579.

51

See generally Davis, supra note 1.

52

Id. at 230.

53

Teresa Herbert, Are Player Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243,
244-45 (2000); Jay Lawrence, “Truth Teller”, Hayes Banished, SPORTING NEWS, Oct. 26,
1987, at 31.
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potential to lead a team to success. As a result, coaches may pressure a team
physician with respect to his or her autonomous decisions regarding diagnosis and
appropriate medical treatment.54 Firing coaches for failing to meet employer
expectations is commonplace in the world of athletics. Coach’s face tremendous
pressure to win, even at the expense of athletes’ long-term health. Phillip Maloney,
the coach of the Vancouver Canucks, obviously felt pressure to win when he
suspended Mike Robitaille and denied him pay for nonparticipation as a result of an
injury.55 Coaches need to produce the best team available from the players on his or
her roster. The overbearing control a coach possesses over a professional team
affords him or her the power to bench players, impose fines and suspensions,
threaten termination, and influence team personnel. Ultimately, however, it is the
team physician’s responsibility to protect athletes from pressures to play through
pain and injury.
A coach’s financial and professional success ultimately depends on players’
present performance. Therefore, a coach may pressure a team physician to
compromise sound medical judgment or accepted practices so that an athlete will be
available for competition.56 As a member of the team staff, a team physician may be
subject to the influences of the coach, the leader of the team under which the doctor
is employed, and forsake his or her professional judgment.
3. Pressures from Professional Athletes
Professional athletes, unlike ordinary patients, pressure physicians to make
decisions which may not be in the athletes’ best long-term health interests in order to
pursue their livelihood. The combined average career of athletes in the NFL, NHL,
and the National Basketball Association (NBA) is a short 4.3 years,57 and a thirty two
year old professional baseball player is considered a seasoned veteran in the latter
stages of his career.58 Meanwhile, the potential for making millions is increasingly
present in the professional sports industry and the competition among amateurs to
reach the big leagues is fierce. The minimum salary for a NBA player is $316,969,
and jumps to a minimum of $1,000,000 for a ten-year veteran.59 The average NHL
player earns $1,365,000 per year.60 Although the average and minimum salaries of
professional athletes are substantial, they are miniscule in comparison to superstar
athletes who command deals in the 100 million-dollar range.61 Professional athletes
achieve superstar status by performing at the highest levels and recording statistics
that top the charts in their respective sports.

54

See Davis, supra note 1, at 219.

55

Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 232.

56

See Davis, supra note 1, at 219.

57

See Shouler, supra note 20, at 4-11.

58

See Davis, supra note 1, at 217.

59

See Shouler, supra note 20, at 82.

60

Id. at 84.

61

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Experienced professional athletes are always fighting off younger players who
want to replace them.62 Thus, they are not inclined to sit out a game and allow
another player an opportunity. Sports trivia buffs will remember that Wally Pipp,
former starter for the New York Yankees sat out one game because of a headache
only to witness Lou Gherig start the next 2,130 consecutive games.63 More recently,
Trent Green, the former starting quarterback for the Saint Louis Rams of the NFL,
was injured and sat out the rest of the season while his back-up, Kurt Warner, went
on to win Superbowl XXXIV, league MVP, Superbowl MVP, a long-term contract,
and ultimately Green’s starting position.64
Professional athletes realize their time is limited to attain superstar status and do
not want to limit their playing time, and potential chances for fame and fortune by
nursing injuries on the sidelines.65 As a result, professional athletes themselves
pressure team physicians by attempting to convince doctors that they are physically
capable to compete.
When players insist that they are able to compete and physicians know otherwise,
team doctors should not certify them eligible to play. One commentator has
suggested that athletes should not be permitted to decide on their own whether to
participate in at least three situations:66 (1) where there are significant risks of severe
harm; (2) where the lucidity of the athlete is in question or his decision making
ability is clouded, for example, a decision made in the heat of battle, (3) and where
the decision to return the athlete to competition would be incompatible with a
broadly-defined standard of professional practice.67 Currently there are no uniform
guidelines directing decisions regarding medical clearance to return to a particular
athletic competition.68
4. Self-Imposed Pressures
A less obvious conflict facing team physicians is self-imposed. A team
physician’s role on a professional sports team is important, and in many situations
team doctors are regarded as contributing members of the team.69 As members of the
team, physicians are influenced by a desire to win that may interfere with their
62

See generally Davis, supra note 1, at 217-20.

63

Id. at 217-18.

64

See George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; Kurt Warner Gives Hope to Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at 1D.
65

See Davis, supra note 1, at 218.

66

See generally King, supra note 1.

67

Id.

68

See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 12-13 (stating that although no uniform standards
exist, physicians should consider the intensity and physical demands of the sport the individual
athlete’s unique physiology whether the athlete has previously participated in the sport with
the conditions the available clinical evidence medical organization or league guidelines the
probability and severity of harm and whether any medication, monitoring, or protective
equipment would minimize potential health risks and enable safe participation).
69

Scott Polsky, Winning Medicine: Professional Sports Team Doctors’ Conflicts of
Interest, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 503, 517-20 (1998).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/15

10

2001]

EXPLOITING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

517

medical judgment.70 Athletes arguably pay the cost. This potential conflict may also
arise when team physicians participate in bonus systems based on the team’s record
or performance, or when they receive championship rings.
The most obvious self-imposed pressure is the desire of the physician to retain
his status as a professional team doctor. Many perks and benefits accompany the
attendant publicity.71 Many team physicians maintain local private practices that
benefit from the exposure of being a professional team’s physician.72 In fact,
recently, NFL teams have invited bids from physicians to compete for the position.
The franchise will offer the position to the physician or organization who will pay
the most, or who will provide the cheapest medical treatment.73 This bidding to treat
athletes reflects the value a physician places on being associated with a professional
sports team.74 Arguably, medical positions awarded to the highest bidder may
compromise the interests of the athletes.75
III. TORT CLAIMS BROUGHT AGAINST PROFESSIONAL TEAMS AND TEAM PHYSICIANS
A. Negligence Claims Against Professional Teams
Collective bargaining agreements governing the major professional sports
leagues in the United States require teams to provide medical care to their athletes.76
Most standard player contracts contain clauses reflecting this duty.77 Accordingly,
professional teams have a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure the safety,
fitness, and health of their players.78 A team may be subject to a negligence or a
breach of contract action for violating these terms.79
Mike Robitaille successfully sued the Vancouver Canucks of the NHL for breach
of contract based on the team’s mistreatment of his injuries.80 Robitaille sustained
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Being a professional team doctor makes sense economically because of the amount of
visibility in the community associated with the position. Recently, some physicians have
actually paid professional sports teams up to $1 million for the rights to provide medical
treatment to their athletes. See id. (citing Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995, at 82); see also Keim, supra note 15, at 215-18.
74

See Keim, supra note 15, at 216.

75

Id. Contracts awarded to the physician who will provide the cheapest medical care (pay
the most for procurement of the employment agreement) do not seem to indicate a situation
where the best interest of the athletes are paramount. In these scenarios, the physician’s
primary commitment appears to be to financial prosperity through association with the
franchise, rather than to the health of his or her patient-athletes.
76

UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 24-28.

77

See Herbert, supra note 53, at 246-47.

78

See generally, Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 228.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 233.
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injuries during an away game. He described to the team trainer that he felt “rubbery”
and “shocking” sensations in his right leg.81 The Canuck’s trainer told doctors from
the home team that Robitaille’s problems were more mental than physical.82 Soon
thereafter, Robitaille was involved in a collision with another player during a game,
after which his right leg jerked uncontrollably and he had to be carried off the ice.83
Robitaille repeatedly asked the team trainer to see a doctor but was never given any
significant medical attention.84 A week later, Robitaille was body checked on the ice
and injured his spinal cord.85 Immediately following the injury, Canuck’s doctors
told Robitaille to go home and take a couple of shots of Courvoisier cognac.86 An
independent doctor subsequently diagnosed Robitaille with a permanent disability.87
The court in Robitaille ultimately held that the Canucks had breached Robitaille’s
player contract by failing to provide adequate health care, despite having actual
notice of his injuries and their potential severity.88
Although Robitaille sued his team directly, most claims brought by athletes focus
on the conduct of the team physician.89 However, professional sports franchises may
be held liable for the acts of employee doctors.90 These suits are based on the theory
of respondeat superior whereby employers are liable for the negligent acts of their
employees. For example, Charles Krueger recovered against the San Francisco
Forty-Niners when the team physician fraudulently withheld medical information
from him.91 Krueger successfully argued that the Forty-Niners maintained sufficient
control over the team physician as an employee, for the team itself to be liable based
on the principle of respondeat superior.92
B. Claims Against Team Physicians
1. Medical Malpractice Claims
The majority of claims against team physicians have been brought as negligence
claims alleging medical malpractice93 based on a team physician’s failure to discover
81

Id. at 231.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 231-32.

85

Id. at 232.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 232.

88

Id. at 233-34.

89

See e.g., Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84; Hendy v. Losse, 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991);
Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Appr. 1978);
Sherwin v. Indianappolis Colts, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
90

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 265 (2002).

91

See Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583-84.

92

Id.

93

See Mitten, supra note 33, at § 2(a).
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an abnormality during a physical examination, improper medical clearance, improper
medical care, or failure to disclose the nature and extent of an injury.94 The
reasonableness of the medical care provided, put at issue in these claims, is measured
according to common tort law negligence principles.95 Regardless of the exact
standard used to evaluate a team doctor’s conduct, decisions are made on a case-bycase basis—ultimately determining whether the physician deviated from reasonable
conduct under the circumstances and exposed the athlete to an unreasonable risk of
harm.96
2. Nondisclosure/Fraudulent Concealment/Misrepresentation Claims
All physicians have a duty to disclose any material information that would
reasonably affect a patient’s decisions regarding treatment of his or her injuries.97 If a
doctor fails to obtain a patient’s informed consent, he or she may be subject to
liability. Informed consent is based on the premise of individual autonomy. A
human being of legal capacity and majority should be able to make decisions
regarding his or her own body.98 The recent trend however, is to require the
disclosure that a reasonable patient needs to make an informed decision.99
A physician’s duty of full disclosure is particularly important within the context
of the professional sports industry. Most professional athletes are accustomed to
playing with pain,100 and generally seek out the quickest rehabilitative options.101 If a
team physician does not fully inform an athlete of the potential dangers associated
with playing with a particular injury, or of the risks of a proposed treatment, the
athlete’s decision is uninformed. Under these circumstances, treatment may be
considered administered without authority as a result of the physician’s breach of his
or her duty of disclosure.102 Ultimately, the lack of informed consent, or treatment
administered in the absence of consent, reduces to actionable negligence against the
care provider.
When team doctors intentionally withhold material information regarding the true
extent or nature of an injury, the risks associated with a particular form of treatment,
or the potential hazards and long-term effects of playing with a specific ailment or

94
Id. For one to recover damages in a negligence claim he or she must prove facts that
give rise to a duty, a failure to conform to the requisite standard of conduct, which actually
caused injury. RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 32, at § 328.
95

See Mitten, supra note 33, at § 2(a); See also King, supra note 1, at 685-92.

96

See RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 32, at §§ 282, 328.

97

See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

98

See id. 780.

99

See UBERSTINE, supra note 7,
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

at 14 A 14 n.66 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
§ 32, 189 (5th ed. 1984).

100

See Davis, supra note 1, at 218.

101

Id. at 216.

102

See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783.
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physical condition, players may also bring claims of fraudulent concealment.103 To
succeed on a claim of fraudulent concealment, a player must prove that the doctor
acted with intent to influence a player to rely on false information in making his or
her decision to continue to play or to return to competition.104 At least one court has
found that inducing an athlete to change his course of conduct or to alter his
decision-making process satisfies the necessary intent element.105 In order to recover
under negligent non-disclosure or fraudulent concealment, an athlete also must prove
causation, i.e. that had he been properly informed, he would not have adhered to the
medical treatment or that the advice caused the harm.106
Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners is the most prominent case imposing
liability on the team physician, and vicariously on the team itself, based on a claim of
fraudulent concealment of medical information.107 Charles Krueger was a defensive
lineman for the Forty Niners for fifteen years.108 Krueger missed very few games
during his career and was respected around the league for playing through the pain
associated with numerous injuries.109 In 1963, Krueger ruptured the medial collateral
ligament in his left knee and underwent surgery, after which the Forty Niners team
doctor declared Krueger’s knee to have undergone a “good repair.”110 Krueger’s
knee subsequently swelled and caused him severe pain during the 1964 season.111 As
treatment for this condition, team physician, Dr. Lloyd Taylor, administered
powerful steroid injections of Novocain and cortisone.112 These steroid injections
were known to cause degenerative abnormalities resulting in cartilage
decomposition.113 Krueger testified that he had received about fifty injections during
that year and then fourteen to twenty injections each year from 1964 to 1973.114

103

See, e.g., Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579; Hendy, 819 P.2d at 1; Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at
163; Sherwin, 752 F. Supp. at 1172.
104

See Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 at 582-83, citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1709, 1710
(“[o]ne who willfully deceives another with the intent to induce him to alter his position to his
injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” The court further
recognized that for the intentional concealment of a material fact to be actionable as fraud,
there must exist a fiduciary relationship. According to the court, the doctor-patient
relationship between Krueger and the physician satisfied this requirement.).
105

Id.

106

Id. at 584-85.

107

See generally id. at 579.

108

Id. at 580.

109

Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 580.

110

Id. at 580-81.

111

Id. at 581.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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During the 1970 season, Krueger felt a piece of his knee break off during a game
and could feel it inside his leg.115 The team physician gave Krueger a pain numbing
shot and advised him to return to play.116 In 1971, Krueger underwent another
surgery to remove loose bodies in his knee after an x-ray revealed degenerative,
post-traumatic changes in his knee joint.117 None of the doctors treating Krueger
informed him of the medically known risks and consequences associated with
injections of steroids,118 nor did they notify him of the presence of loose bodies in his
knee.119 Krueger testified that had he known of the dangers associated with receiving
the injections, or the consequences of continuing to play professional football in his
condition, he would have rejected the treatment and retired.120 Krueger is now
permanently disabled.121 He suffers from traumatic arthritis and a crippling
degenerative condition in his left knee that prohibits him from standing for
prolonged periods of time or walking up and down stairs without severe pain.122
The Krueger court found that Dr. Lloyd Taylor breached his duty when he failed
to disclose information necessary for Krueger to furnish his informed consent.123
Furthermore, the court concluded that the physician’s actions constituted fraud.124
The court found that an actual intent to deceive was not required. The intent to
induce an athlete to adopt or abandon a course of action, which ultimately proved to
be harmful, was sufficient for liability under a fraudulent concealment claim.125 In
accepting Krueger’s allegations of intent, the court considered the obvious interest
that the Forty Niners had in prolonging Krueger’s career.126 The Krueger litigation
stunned the professional sports industry127 and seemed to open the doors of recovery
for the injured professional athlete. However, few athletes have found similar
success with claims against team physicians and professional franchises.128

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 581.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 582.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 584.

124

Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584.

125

Id. at 584 (citing Peskin v. Spuires, 319 P.2d 405 (Cal. App. Ct. 1957)).

126

Id.

127

See Jennifer Lynn Woodlief, Fraudulent Concealment of Medical Information in
Professional Football, 9 SPG ENT & SPORTS LAW. 3, 6-7 (1991).
128

See, e.g., Martin v. Casagrande, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1990); Depiano v.
Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
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IV. CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS GOVERNING
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETIC CONTRACTS
In most professional sports, players’ unions bargain with team owners on behalf
of all of the players regarding the terms of standard player employment contracts.129
The resulting agreement between the representative entity and the team owners is the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter CBA).130 This Agreement dictates the
terms and conditions of standard player contracts.131 Although some terms are
negotiable, the CBA expresses the minimum obligations and duties within
professional athletic employment agreements.132 CBAs also address the procedure
for resolving disputes.133 The typical CBA entitles the athlete to team-provided or
paid-for medical care.134 Thus, standard player contracts typically allow the team to
appoint a physician who ultimately makes final medical decisions.135
A. Standard vs. Guaranteed Player Contracts
Professional sports employment contracts fall into two general categories. Under
the standard contract, a club may terminate a player’s employment if the player is
unable to perform.136 Under a standard contract, a player injured in the course and
scope of his employment will receive full compensation during his disability until
the end of the season.137 The injured player is also entitled to reasonable medical
costs, usually for a specified time period from the date of initial treatment.138
Under a guaranteed contract, the team usually agrees to pay the injured player a
full salary despite any injuries that the athlete might incur during the scope and
course of his employment for the entire agreed-upon term, as well as compensation
for reasonable medical costs.139 This type of agreement ensures the player’s salary
for the agreed-upon time period, even if the athlete fails to exhibit skills sufficient to
qualify him as a member of that particular team.140
The terms of standard and guaranteed contracts provide compensation for injury
without regard to the manner in which the athlete was injured.141 There is no

129

See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 29, at 778.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

See Herbert, supra note 53, at 246-47.

134

Id.

135

See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 29, at 829-30.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id. at 247-48.

140

See Herbert, supra note 53, at 247.

141

See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 29, at 829-30.
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differentiation between accidental, negligent, or intentional injuries.142 Thus, the
compensation an injured athlete receives is measured the same for an athlete injured
in an accidental collision in practice and an athlete injured by negligent medical
treatment.143 These agreements provide no compensation for any tortious acts
committed against the athlete by team physicians or by team personnel. This lack of
accountability and personal responsibility creates disincentives for team doctors
and/or team personnel to administer prudent care founded on athletes’ best interests.
B. Federal Preemption of State Law Tort Claims
The Supreme Court has authorized federal courts to fashion a uniform body of
federal law governing CBAs.144 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (hereinafter LMRA) controls procedural and substantive adjudication of litigious
conflicts between employers and labor unions.145 The Supreme Court has declared
§ 301 of the LMRA to preempt state law.146 Claims substantially dependent upon the
interpretation of provisions within the agreement between parties to a labor contract
(CBA) are therefore governed exclusively by federal law.147 Courts hold this
preemptive effect to extend to all suits wherein the terms of the CBA, including
those suits alleging tort claims.148
The terms in professional player contracts address injury and medical care
provision. Any professional athlete’s claim against his team that is substantially
related to the contractual provisions of the CBA is governed by federal law. Once a
court determines that a claim or dispute is governed by LMRA § 301, the court
defers to any arbitration provisions contained within the labor agreement (CBA).149
No court will reach the merits of any claim which, on its face, appears to be
governed by an applicable arbitration provision.150 Thus, athletes are often excluded
from seeking redress through litigation for injuries associated with negligent medical
care.
Professional sports CBAs contain arbitration clauses that establish exclusive
procedures for resolving specific grievances arising out of particular contract
provisions.151 As a consequence, grievances arising out of contractual provisions
142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).

145

Id. at 220.

146

Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 87 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996).

147

Id.

148

Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 219-20.

149

See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 830-31. See also Sherwin, 752 F. Supp. at 1172;
Smith, 87 F. 3d at 717.
150

See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 249, citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
151
See Herbert, supra note 53, at 246-49, citing UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, THE
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS ¶ 7(b)(1) (contract referred to here is
representative of all major sports league employment agreements).
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addressing medical treatment effectively become breach of contract claims. The
resulting award provides a player only with contractual damages. Professional
athletes cannot recover for physical and mental pain and suffering, physical
disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of earning capacity through arbitration
proceedings.152 Furthermore, the possibility of punitive damages to deter abusive
practices and customs within professional sports are unavailable. Arbitration as an
exclusive remedy for athletes who are physically injured by negligent medical
treatment or fraudulent diagnosis, attaches no personal liability to professional sports
teams or sports physicians. Therefore, it fails to create an incentive for doctors to
employ precautious medical treatments or to adhere to a prudent standard of care.
In Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., two football players employed under one-year
standard contracts were injured during the pre-season.153 The NFL prohibits
terminating a player’s contract if the player is recovering from a football-related
injury.154 Therefore, the players were offered settlements to leave the team
voluntarily.155 Neither accepted the team’s offers. In order to coerce them into
accepting these offers and leaving the team, the Oilers allegedly forced the athletes
through an abusive rehabilitation program.156 This program ostensibly consisted of a
reduction in actual rehabilitative treatment, the imposition of strenuous exercise far
exceeding earlier demands, sleep deprivation resulting from workouts beginning at
four in the morning and some ending at eleven at night, and intentional confusion of
workout schedules.157
The strenuous program caused one of the players to collapse from exhaustion
during a 4:00 A.M. workout session.158 Together, the players sued the Houston
Oilers and the team trainer for injuries sustained as a result of the rehabilitation
program.159 Sherman and Tracy Smith brought claims of coercion, duress, assault
and battery, extortion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.160
The Oilers maintained that the claims were preempted by federal law pursuant to
LMRA § 301, and, therefore, must be resolved in compliance with the arbitration
provisions of the CBA governing NFL employment contracts.161 In response, the
players argued that resolution of their claims did not require interpretation of the
terms of the CBA, and, alternatively, that the Oilers’ conduct was sufficiently
outrageous to override LMRA § 301 preemption.162
152

See Herbert, supra note 53, at 249, citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 399.

153

Smith, 87 F.3d at 718.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id. at 718-719.

157

Id. at 718. All the while team staff threatened to blackball Sherman and Tracy from
employment with other NFL teams
158

Smith, 87 F.3d at 719.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.
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In reaching a verdict for the Oilers, the district court determined that the claims
ultimately amounted to an underlying labor dispute over the termination pay
settlement offer.163 According to the court, this dispute was indistinguishable and
inseparable from the Oilers’ conduct in forcing the players to choose between the
terms of the offer and participation in the rehabilitation program.164 LMRA § 301
preempted the claims because their resolution depended upon an analysis of the
governing CBA, specifically, a clause authorizing NFL franchises to require
participation in rehabilitation programs.165 As a result, the players’ only recourse was
arbitration as per the CBA.166
In pursuing an appeal, the players argued that the Oilers’ conduct was so
outrageous that the CBA could not be interpreted to have condoned it, and therefore,
no interpretation of any CBA provision was necessary to resolve the claims.167 In
addressing this argument, the appellate court conceded that where the actions
involved consisted entirely of an employer’s physical battery of an employee, there
is no need for the interpretation of any labor agreement. It is generally understood
that the CBA could not have condoned the intentional tort.168 Therefore,
adjudication of the battery claim did not depend upon the meaning of any terms
included in the CBA.169 However, the Court further stated that, in order for a
physical battery to be independent of the CBA, there must be a direct physical act of
violence committed against the claimant.170 Without an allegation of a direct
physical battery, the court was unwilling to apply the above-mentioned battery
exclusion.171 The court expressly suggested that the players themselves were
responsible for the mistreatment because they “wanted to remain with a team that
didn’t want them” and that the two men could have chosen not to participate.172
Ultimately, the court translated the player’s tort claims into contractual disputes over
the relative bargaining power of the team, resulting in unreasonable negotiations

163

Smith, 87 F.3d at 720-21.

164

Id. at 721 (The court stated, “Another way of stating this is that we have here a case
involving contract rights, not condoned violence… Whether the Oilers had a legal right to
require the players either to endure the workouts or quit is therefore a question of contract
law.” This type of reasoning transforms a claim scrutinizing potentially tortuous, or at least
negligent conduct into one which will only measure the conformity of the conduct to a
contract term.).
165

See generally id. at 720-21.

166

Id. at 721.

167

Id. at 717, 719.

168

Smith, 87 F.3d at 720.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Iid.

172

Id.
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concerning the termination offer.173 Characterized in this way, the court deferred the
dispute over the players’ contractual rights to the prescribed arbitration methods.174
In denying Tracy and Sherman Smith an avenue for compensation for their
injuries other than binding arbitration, the Smith court defined and characterized the
players’ claims as contractual in nature. The court in Smith, failed to separate the
issues, and arguably blurred them into one. Whether the Oilers could require their
players to undergo the rehabilitation program may have required interpretation of the
CBA. The players, however, were suing for the injuries sustained as a result of
participation in the program. They sought damages for the intentional torts the team
committed against them, unrelated to their respective employment contracts.
Even though the court in Smith acknowledged physical battery claims as
exceptions to federal preemption, it refused to apply this exception to the facts
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the team committed a direct act of physical
violence against them.175 However, American jurisprudence has long recognized that
no direct physical act or touching is required to recover under a claim of battery.176
The Smith court’s analysis effectively shields professional sports teams from tort
liability for abuse of their athletes as long as the team or team employees never
directly hit or otherwise batter the athlete.
CBAs governing professional athlete employment agreements shield team
franchises from personal liability or sanction for player mistreatment by limiting
athletes’ grievance procedures to arbitration. Consequently, professional teams are
not threatened with potentially large damage awards to discourage negligent and/or
reckless care of athletes. Furthermore, arbitration as an exclusive remedy denies
injured athletes adequate compensation.
Arbitration awards are effectively
nonreviewable by courts.177
V. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
A. Underlying Policy/Typical Statute
Workers’ compensation laws further impede athletes from obtaining adequate
compensation for injuries resulting from a team physician’s negligence or fraud.
State workers’ compensation laws provide cash-wage benefits and medical care to
victims of work-related injuries.178 The underlying premise of workers’
compensation legislation is the social desirability of giving employees a definite and
173

Smith, 87 F.3d at 720.

174

Id. at 721.

175

Id. at 720.

176

See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (citing Morgan
v. Lyacomo, 1 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 1941) where the court declared that it is not necessary to
touch a plaintiff’s body or clothing or knock or snatch anything from a plaintiff’s hand or
touch anything connected with his or her body to constitute an assault and battery, so long as
the conduct was offensive).
177
See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2002). The Federal Arbitration Act removes court
jurisdiction over disputes wherein the parties have contractually agreed to dispute resolution
via arbitration proceedings.
178

See ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (2000).
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efficient means of compensation for injuries suffered in the course of employment,
without the necessity of proving fault.179 Injured employees give up the right to sue
their employers for full compensation in return for definite, modest recovery without
litigation, while employers protect themselves from large damage awards in
exchange for liability without determination of fault.180
Workers’ compensation laws only provide coverage to persons having the status
of employee and expressly exclude independent contractors.181 Most state statutes
offer benefits to the injured employee of between one half and two thirds of the
employee’s average weekly wage, and impose maximum and minimum limits.182
These benefit awards are limited to disabilities. Workers’ compensation does not
offer benefits for physical or mental pain and suffering.183 Consequently, workers’
compensation does not restore the claimant to the position he or she was in prior to
the work-related injury. The amount of compensation awarded is generally not much
higher than is necessary to prevent the worker from insolvency.184
B. Classification as Employee or Independent Contractor
The nature of a team physician’s relationship with a sports franchise determines
whether an athlete’s injury caused by a team doctor will be covered under workers’
compensation statutes. When employee athletes are injured during the course of
their employment for the team, and their claims are against team physicians
considered to be employees of the team, workers’ compensation may be the athletes’
exclusive remedy.185 This situation prohibits injured athletes from recovering
damages associated with their injuries, and instead, provides them with a percentage
of their wages because of their inability to work.186 As a result, athletes go
uncompensated for the tort committed against them and negligent and fraudulent
medical care providers escape liability. The classification of doctors as independent
contractors however, allows injured athletes to collect damages above and beyond
the benefits available under workers’ compensation statutes. When athletes are able
to recover against an independent contractor team physician directly, they can pursue
compensation not only for loss of wages, but also for physical and mental pain and
suffering. Furthermore, the liability associated with this latter scenario attaches at
the source of the culpable conduct and allows for potential punitive damage awards.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency §220 sets forth factors that courts use to
distinguish employees from independent contractors. These factors include: (1) the
extent of control that the master exercises over the details of the work in question;

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id. § 1.01, at 1-3.

182

Id.

183

See LARSON, supra note 178, at § 1.03[4], 1-10.

184

Id. at § 1.03[5], at 1-10.

185

See, e.g., Hendy v. Losse, 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991); Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (both cases
held that workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy for injured professional athletes).
186

See LARSON, supra note 178, at § 1.03[4], 1-10.
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(2) whether the one employed is in a distinct occupation; (3) whether the work
involved is such that it normally involves supervision; (4) the skill required to
perform the work; (5) who supplies the necessary instrumentalities; (6) the length
and time for which the person is employed; (7) the method of payment; and (8) the
intent of the parties.187 In addition to the Restatement factors, courts consider an
employer’s tax filings as well as other documents associated with employment.188
These documents can be relevant to the determination whether an employeremployee situation exists.
In Bryant v. Fox, former Chicago Bears players brought an action against the
team’s physician for medical malpractice.189 In an attempt to circumvent workers’
compensation laws as an exclusive remedy, the plaintiffs argued that the doctor was
an independent contractor.190 The Bryant court determined that the physician was
not an employee of the Chicago Bears, and thus, the players’ relief was not limited to
the benefits available under the Illinois’ workers’ compensation statute.191 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon evidence that the team paid the doctor
on a case-by-case basis, that the team did not offer many of their employee benefits
to the physician, that the team did not provide the doctor with a W-2 tax form, nor
did they deduct social security from his pay, and most importantly, the team did not
exercise the requisite level of control over the physician’s duties.192 Consequently,
the players were able to bring a tort action against the physician.
Recent litigation, however, suggests that professional teams, sports physicians,
and team physician insurance providers have learned from cases like Bryant v.
Fox.193 Many insurance providers now require insured team physicians to sign
detailed employment contracts with professional teams.194 These employment
contracts expressly declare the physician an employee. The terms’ structure creates
an employer-employee situation. Insurers are obviously cognizant of the immunity a
team doctor enjoys under state workers’ compensation laws when he or she is
classified as an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor. The case of
Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks reflects this trend.195

187

See RESTATMENT OF AGENCY § 220 (2)(a)-(j) (1958).

188

See Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (where the court considered the
filing of W-2 tax forms in determining a doctor’s employment status).
189

Id. at 775-76.

190

Id.

191

Id. at 778.

192

Id.

193

See, e.g., Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968 P.2d 883 (Wash. App. Ct. 1998) 968 P.2d
883 (where a team physician’s insurance provider required the doctor to sign an employment
contract with a professional team to remain eligible for malpractice coverage. No doubt the
insurance company understood the workers’ compensation immunity associated with injuries
resulting from the negligence of a co-employee.).
194

Id. at 885.

195

Id. at 883-88.
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In Daniels, a former Seahawk player claimed that the team’s physician was
amenable to a medical malpractice suit because of his independent contractor
status.196 Daniels, a professional football player, injured himself while playing for
the Seattle Seahawks.197 The team doctor diagnosed his injury as a groin pull and
advised him to return to play.198 Daniels was unable to play and never recovered.199
Daniels ultimately found out that he had, in fact, fractured his rectus femoris and that
the team physician had misdiagnosed his injury.200
Although the physician originally provided medical care under a fee-for-service
arrangement with the team, later, his insurance carrier required that he sign a detailed
employment contract.201 Pursuant to this contract, the team paid the physician an
annual salary. His delineated obligations to the Seahawks consisted of about sixty
percent of his medical practice.202 Under the terms of the employment agreement,
the team handled the doctor’s relevant tax filings and paid workers’ compensation
benefits to the state.203 However, the physician received no health insurance, sick
leave, eligibility in the team’s 401(K), life insurance, or vacation pay, all of which
were available to Seattle Seahawk employees.204
Although the physician retained sole responsibility for medical decisions, the
court determined that the employment contract clearly controlled the doctor’s
physical conduct in performing his contractual duties for the team.205 Consequently,
co-employee immunity under Washington’s workers’ compensation statute barred
the athlete’s suit against the doctor.206 As a result, the court never considered the
merits of Daniels’ malpractice claim.207 At the insistence of the doctor’s personal
insurance provider, the Seahawks and the physician successfully drafted an
employment agreement, under which athlete employees were effectively barred from
bringing lawsuits against the doctor.
Even though a few states have enacted specific legislation excluding or limiting
the coverage for professional athletes,208 the statutory application by the Daniels
196

Id. at 884.

197

Id.

198

Daniels, 968 P.2d at 884.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 885.
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Id.
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Daniels, 968 P.2d at 885.

204

Id.
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Id. at 883, 888 n.4.
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Id. at 887-88.
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Id.
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See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (WEST 2001), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 §1
(Law. Co-op. 1993), MO. ANN. STAT. ch. § 270 (Vernon 1991), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 (2001)
§ 22, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095, (WEST 2001) and WASH. LAWS §51.08.013 all of which
exclude professional athletes from workers’ compensation legislation [Hereinafter Statutes].
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court represents the majority view in states that have not specifically addressed
professional athletes in their workers’ compensation statutes.209 Under most workers’
compensation laws, team physicians can effectively protect themselves from players’
negligence claims by crafting an employment arrangement in which the professional
athlete and team physician are co-employees.
Ultimately a team physician is employed for the medical expertise he or she
possesses. The typical employment agreement with a professional sports team
expressly states the autonomous nature of the physician’s medical decisions.210 In
spite of this fact, courts continue to hold that professional teams, as employers,
maintain the requisite control over a team physician’s duties to qualify him or her as
an employee.211 For example, the Daniels court stated that even though, “Dr. Auld
[the team physician] is solely responsible for exercising his independent medical
judgment. …[w]e decline to carve out an exception of this test for physicians merely
because they retain control over their professional judgment.”212 The immunity that
team physicians can enjoy under workers’ compensation systems reduces the
incentive for them to treat athletes with the utmost care, and contemporaneously
reduces the compensation available to injured athletes.
C. Intentional Tort Exception
Some states exclude intentional tort claims from workers’ compensation
coverage.213 For example, in Krueger, the court, applying California State law,
exempted.214 Kreuger’s action for fraud and deceit from workers’ compensation
coverage.215 The state court held that the physician’s intentional concealment of
medical information amounted to fraud because of the fiduciary nature of the doctorathlete relationship.216 The Krueger case applied a very specific state law217 and
appears to stand alone in regard to its probative outcome. In fact, subsequent
athletes within the same state have attempted to apply the section relied upon by the
Krueger court without success.218

209

See Statutes, supra note 208 (these statutes are the only state laws currently accounting
for professional athletes).
210
See, e.g., Daniels, 968 P.2d at 885. The employment contract in this case, while
providing for a relationship between team and physician whereby team retained significant
control over the physician’s duties, expressly stated that the doctor would be solely
responsible for exercising his independent medical judgment. See also Russell, supra note 43,
at 307.
211

Id.

212

Daniels, 968 P.2d at 888 n.4.

213

See Statutes, supra note 208.
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See Kreuger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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Id.
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Id. at 582-83.
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CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1709, 1710 (West 1987).

218

See Hendy, 819 P.2d at 1.
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In states that recognize an intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation
statutes, the exception appears to be extremely narrow.219 In DePiano v. Montreal
Baseball Club, Ltd., a minor league baseball player sued his former team alleging
intentional injury as an exception to the exclusivity of New York’s workers’
compensation remedies.220 The player contended that the team forced him to
continue to play with a known injury and, as a result, intentionally injured him.221
Applying New York law, the Pennsylvania District Court commented on the difficult
burden of proof associated with the exception that the plaintiff sought.222
Citing New York precedent, the DePiano court held that in order to qualify under
the intentional injury exception to workers’ compensation coverage, the defendant
must have engaged in the challenged conduct with a distinct desire to bring about the
specific consequences of the act.223 Accordingly, mere knowledge, along with an
appreciation of the risk of injury, is not equivalent to intent to cause the injury, and
therefore insufficient for qualification under the exception.224 The court found no
evidence that the defendant intended to cause injury and further declared that no
amount of negligence would suffice to meet the requisite burden.225 In fact, the court
relied on the fact that the team was short outfielders to prove that the team was
motivated by a desire to keep their players healthy and available for competition.226
In Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. and Martin v. Casagrande,
professional athletes made similar claims arguing that they fell within the intentional
tort exception to workers’ compensation statutes.227 The courts denied them relief
under tort law because they had already accepted workers’ compensation benefits.228
In both cases, the athletes had accepted workers’ compensation benefits prior to
filing suit for damages.229 The Martin court expressly stated that, where an employee
has received workers’ compensation benefits, his right to sue his employer no longer
219

See, e.g., DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116, 117 (W.D. Pa.
1987); Martin v. Casagrande, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. App. 1990). See also Gambrell, 562
S.W.2d at 163 (where the court decided that the fraud and deceit alleged by a professional
football player against his former team and team physician merged with the actual physical
injury for which the athlete had already recovered workers compensation benefits).
220

DePiano, 663 F. Supp. at 116.

221

Id. at 117.

222

The court stated that in order to succeed under the exception, “[T]he claimant employee
must prove an intentional or deliberate act by the employer directed at causing harm to that
particular employee.” Id.
223

Id.

224

Id. (The court goes on to say that the fact that an injury is substantially certain to occur
is not enough to hold an employee liable for an injury to a co-employee in the course of
employment).
225

DePiano, 663 F. Supp. at 116, 117.

226

Id.
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Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 163; Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 68.

228

Id.

229

Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 164; Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
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exists and thus, the merits of any subsequent claims are not considered.230 Similarly,
the Gambrell court recognized that where an injury is determined to be compensable
under workers’ compensation, any common law suit is subsequently barred.231
Employment agreements in the professional sports entertainment industry are
contracts for future performance and differ from typical at-will employment
relationships. A professional team has exclusive rights to an athlete under contract
and the player is prohibited from working for other teams. Thus, the courts’ narrow
interpretation of the intentional injury exception has a greater impact on the
professional athlete’s work environment compared to the at-will employment setting.
Teams have total control over the nature of medical care an athlete receives. It is
usually the team physician’s final decision as to the type and amount of medical
treatment administered.232 What’s more, injuries are constantly present in the
professional sports work place. Even if a team’s immediate intent may be to keep a
player available for competition, teams and team physicians should not escape
personal liability for the injuries to athletes that are certain to result.
D. Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine is another exception to the exclusivity of workers’
compensation statutes. In its broadest interpretation, this doctrine stands for the
premise that a co-employee may assume a relationship with another co-employee
distinct from the one originally established or accepted in the work place
environment, and any injuries resulting from this unique relationship are not subject
to coverage by workers’ compensation.233 Although athletes, in suits against
physicians and sports teams, regularly invoke this doctrine, courts rarely recognize
its applicability.234
In Hendy v. Losse, Hendy, a professional football player for the San Diego
Chargers, sued the team physician alleging medical malpractice for the treatment of a
knee injury he sustained during the 1986 and 1987 NFL seasons.235 Hendy argued
that the team doctor negligently caused him permanent injury by advising him to
continue to play in spite of his injury.236 The physician moved for dismissal of the
action, arguing that Hendy’s work-related injury was compensable exclusively under
workers’ compensation.237 In rebuttal, Hendy maintained that the physician was
acting in a dual capacity when he diagnosed and treated his injury.238
230

Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 70.

231

Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 168.

232

See Herbert, supra note 53, at 252-53.

233

See Daniels, 968 P.2d at 888 (where the court expressed the Dual Capacity Doctrine as
an exception to workers’ compensation immunity where an employee acts in a capacity
outside the typical employer-employee or employee-employee relationship, and this additional
capacity imposes obligations separate from those imposed in the typical/original relationship).
234

See, e.g., Daniels, 968 P.2d at 883; Hendy, 819 P.2d at 4.
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Hendy, 819 P.2d at 4.
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Id. at 3.

237

Id.
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Id. at 4.
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The court declared that the decisive issue in these types of cases is whether the
physician was acting within the ordinary scope of his or her employment when he or
she treated the claimant.239 The court held that the doctor, in treating a player for a
team that employed him, was acting within the scope of his employment. Hence, coemployee immunity barred any recovery other than workers’ compensation
benefits.240 The court based its decision upon the following rationale,
[T]he purpose of section 3601 is to make workmen’s compensation the
exclusive remedy of an injured workman against his employer. That
purpose would be defeated if a right of action existed against a fellow
employee acting in the scope of his employment in such a way that the
fellow employee’s negligence could be imputed to the employer.241
VI. PREVENTING ABUSE AND PROVIDING ADEQUATE COMPENSATION:
PROPOSED REMEDIES
The triangular relationship between a professional sports team, a team physician,
and a professional athlete creates a complex dynamic exposing physicians to
pressures that may impair their sound medical judgment and facilitate physical abuse
of professional athletes. At the same time, the professional sports industry is
organized to limit, and, in most cases, deny adequate compensation to athletes for
their injuries, and to protect physicians and teams from liability. CBAs controlling
employment agreements within professional sports leagues create substantial
obstacles to recovery for injured athletes. Furthermore, the legal standards
applicable to professional sports physicians are uncertain. Finally, workers’
compensation statutes and co-employee immunity impede legal redress for injuries.
This section proposes solutions that promote accountability within the industry as
well as the well-being of professional athletes’ physical health.
A. Create a Well-Defined Uniform Standard of Care
The diverse background of specialists providing medical care to professional
sports teams prevents uniform definition and classification of the term professional
team physician.242 As a result, the legal standard of care to which these various
practitioners are subject to, or should be subject to, is uncertain.
The need for a uniform standard governing the practice of sports medicine in
order to provide an incentive to physicians to act reasonably is evident. Without a
clear standard for determining the reasonableness of a sports medicine practitioner’s
conduct, team physicians will continue to make questionable medical decisions and
recommendations. As sports popularity has risen,243 so has the number of physicians
practicing sports medicine.244 Concurrently, the literature and resources available
239

Id. at 11.

240

Hendy, 819 P.2d at 12.
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See King, supra note 1, at 658-63.
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Id. at 657.

244

See Solares, supra note 43, at 238-40.
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concerning medical care to the athlete has dramatically increased.245 Experts in the
field, along with the large number of responsible sports medicine practitioners must
influence the American Medical Association to recognize sports medicine as an
accredited subspecialty within the general practice of medicine.
This recognition will provide the court system with the requisite societal
evidence necessary to create a heightened standard of care. A written exam or
fellowship requirement will induce courts to recognize a more specific standard and
eliminate the lengthy process of evolution through judicial scrutiny alone. More
importantly, team physicians will know exactly what is expected of them, resulting
in the cautious administration of medical care and ultimately, less injury as a result
of exploitation of the professional athlete. The incentive to provide the prudent care
associated with uniform application of a heightened standard of care is imperative.
Currently, the trend is an accepted practice standard, which requires a sports
medicine practitioner to provide care in accordance with reasonable expectations of
physicians in general.246 Another modern standard imposed upon physicians
practicing sports medicine amounts to a “what should have been done under the
circumstances” test.247 The evolution of a specific sports medicine standard would
likely impose liability on such a specialist where none may be attached to the general
practitioner.
B. Prohibit Professional Teams From Providing Medical Care
As discussed above, the conflicts facing team physicians in the professional
sports industry to unduly influence a doctor’s autonomous medical discretion. The
end result often is inadequate or even fraudulent. Eliminating the conflicts and
pressures facing team physicians would allow physicians to provide care in an
environment where athletes’ best interests govern every medical decision.
1. Employment by Players Unions/League
If professional sports teams did not employ team physicians, team management
would have less influence over the doctors’ day-to-day decisions.
Some
commentators argue that league players unions should hire physicians.248 Under this
proposed solution, the third party paying for the medical treatment is an entity that
advocates athletes’ best interests. The result would be a doctor-athlete relationship
more closely related to the typical doctor-patient relationship, one in which the
patient’s best interests dictate any proposed treatment. The independent nature of the
physician’s employment would reduce the doctor’s susceptibility to pressures from
team management.
245

See Russell, supra note 43, at 300 (giving some examples of available resources such
as: Am. J. Sp. Med., J. Sp. Med. & Physical Fitness, Physician’s Sp. Med. Science & Sp. Med.
Science Sp. & Exercise.).
246

See King, supra note 1, at 688-91.

247

See Mitten, supra note 33, at § 2[b].

248

It is argued that when league players unions pay for medical care the conflicts facing
the team physician are dramatically reduced, if not eliminated, that the athletes are afforded
more involvement in making decisions regarding their bodies, and most importantly,
physicians are given incentive to administer health care according to the players’ best
interests. See generally Solares, supra note 43.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/15

28

2001]

EXPLOITING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

535

Team physicians, collectively working for the league or players themselves
through employment arrangements with the unions, arguably could establish a more
cohesive unit whereby information could be shared and techniques developed more
efficiently.
2. Well-Defined Employment Arrangements
A clear and express employment agreement between the professional team and
physician is a less radical means of potentially eliminating conflicts facing the team
physician. The medical doctor is a highly trained professional and should demand
that employment contracts expressly reflect the autonomous nature of his or her
position with regards to medical treatment. Although this solution may be unrealistic
because professional sports teams can find physicians who are willing to agree to
less stringent terms, a definite legal standard governing sports medicine, coupled
with a real threat of liability, may encourage physicians to demand such terms.
3. Eliminate Incentive Pressures
As previously mentioned, team physicians have financial incentives that
influence their treatment decisions. Leagues should not allow team physicians to
participate in bonus systems conditioned upon wins or playoff qualifications.
League regulations should void contracts that provide for monetary incentives and
bonuses for team physicians. Furthermore, a team doctor should not receive a
championship ring should his or her team attain such a goal.
Physicians must take it upon themselves to retain professional objectivity and not
succumb to the surrounding pressures prevalent in professional sports. Thus, the
need for professional resources through organizations and associations, as well as
publications, is obvious.
C. Redefine the Relationship Between Healthcare Provider and
Healthcare Purchaser
Ultimately, the only way to eliminate the significant conflicts facing team
physicians is to rearrange the current relationship between the health care provider
and the purchaser of such care. The professional team and the athlete employee
often have different interests. Eliminating the control teams have over subordinate
physician employees offers the most effective solution. Realizing reform will take
the initiative of players unions and ultimately, professional athletes themselves.
Prohibiting professional sports organizations from providing athlete medical care
would additionally help the professional athlete to overcome the restrictions of the
CBA governing his employment agreement. In the absence of a contractual term
providing for team-administered care, claims arising out of negligent medical
treatment would be independent from the CBA and would not require interpretation
of any included provisions. This arrangement would, therefore, allow state tort
claims, otherwise preempted by federal law, and provide an avenue for adequate
compensation. The attendant liability would also contribute to the evolution of an
accepted legal standard of conduct. The absence of a uniform body of law
delineating the legal standards applicable to sports medicine practitioners inhibits
incentives for team physicians to act according to athletes’ best interests.
Furthermore, if treating physicians were not employees of teams, state workers’
compensation statutes would not bar suits against physicians by way of co-employee
immunity. The protection from liability most team physicians currently enjoy would
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become unavailable. As a result, athletes would have the opportunity to pursue
compensation above and beyond workers’ compensation benefits, which are often
times inadequate for the relatively highly paid professional player. The imposition
of liability on the caregiver would encourage better care.
D. Amend/Redefine Application of State Workers’ Compensation Laws
The underlying policy of workers’ compensation has been accepted as a means of
offering financial security to employees injured on the job. Within the sports
entertainment industry, however, workers’ compensation laws shield teams and team
physicians from tort liability and encourage physical exploitation of athletes.
Professional sports franchises as employers exercise a much greater level of control
over athletes than do employers outside the sports entertainment industry. For
example, a professional athlete may not change employers unless he is traded, and
professional teams, unlike other employers, retain total control over the health of the
athletes. The workers’ compensation system must recognize the professional
athlete’s unique working environment, and alter its application accordingly in order
to protect the athlete’s welfare.
Professional athletes should be able to bring legal claims against team physicians
for malpractice regardless of physicians’ status as team employees. Application of
the co-employee immunity doctrine in this instance encourages less than competent
medical treatment because no real threat of liability influences the physician. An
injured professional athlete patient should have the right to the same claims against a
doctor, as does the injured non-athlete patient. Physicians should ultimately be held
responsible when their conduct falls below the requisite expected standard.
Professional athletes should be excluded from state workers’ compensation
statutes, or alternatively, state statutes should be amended to allow athletes to sue
team physicians. Either reform would promote more competent care. In addition, the
potential threat of vicarious liability would discourage professional teams from
jeopardizing the health of their players. Although this result represents a departure
from the underlying policies associated with workers’ compensation, it should be
allowed within the professional sports industry to promote the health and safety of
professional athlete employees because of the unique control sports franchises have
over employee athletes.
Alternatively, physicians could be defined as independent contractors for the
purposes of workers’ compensation laws. Medical doctors are ultimately employed
for their independent medical judgment and thus, should be treated as independent
contractors. No control should ever be retained over a doctor’s expert medical
discretion and therefore, the title of independent contractor is appropriate. Modern
case law comports with this notion and considers physicians employed by a hospital
to be independent contractors249. Defined as such, the co-employee immunity
doctrine is inapplicable and athletes can hold physicians accountable for negligent
treatment and fraudulent medical care.
Although some states exclude professional athletes from their workers’
compensation legislation,250 and others, such as California allow tort actions against
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See Cilicek v. Inova Health System Services, 115 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 1997).
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See Statutes, supra note 208.
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co-employees who can prove fraud,251 most state statutes contain no such provisions.
Without an amendment or exception to state workers’ compensation laws accounting
for the professional athlete, players have little to no protection from a team
physician’s substandard medical care.
E. Athletes and Representatives Become More Involved In Medical Treatment
The professional athlete can insure proficient medical care despite the influences
professional teams may have over team doctors. Any professional athlete’s career
depends upon the use of his or her body and therefore, athletes should assume a more
proactive role regarding the medical treatment they receive. Accordingly, athletes
should demand full disclosure and attempt to educate themselves on any injury so
that they can make reasonable decisions regarding their own bodies. Furthermore,
athletes should demand second opinions from independent doctors when they feel
that team physicians are not administering care in accordance with their best interests
or feel pressured to return to competition before they are ready.
Although most contracts hold teams responsible for administering medical
care,252 an athlete and his agent should negotiate the right to a second, independent
opinion. Players unions should help professional athletes in establishing this type of
practice. For example, had Charles Krueger gotten a second opinion earlier, he
might not be permanently disabled today; and if Mike Robitaille had done the same,
he might not have had to endure the pain and suffering he did. Contractual
provisions guaranteeing the right to an outside physician would eliminate many of
the injuries associated with fraudulent concealment situations, and reduce the longterm abuse many athletes experience.
VII. CONCLUSION
Professional sports are a powerful attraction in the United States and the industry
generates substantial amounts of money. The commodities of this industry are the
professional players who compete for a living. The pressure to win leads to the
compromise of the health and safety of professional athletes. Team sports’
physicians face extreme pressure to clear athletes for competition and often make
decisions in derogation of sound medical judgment. The non-acceptance of a
uniform standard of care applicable to sports physicians exacerbates this
predicament. Sports medicine is most definitely a specialty of medicine and should
be recognized as such by the formation and acceptance of a uniform standard.
The money side of the sports entertainment industry has recognized that highlevel competition translates into financial success. Exploitation of professional
athletes through unreasonable medical treatment currently goes unchecked as a result
of the governing CBAs and applicable federal law and the immunity afforded teams
and physicians under state workers’ compensation statutes. In order to protect
professional athletes, liability must potentially attach at the level at which the care is
administered. Creating a well-defined standard of care applicable to team
physicians, eliminating pressures facing team doctors, and recognizing the problems
251
See CAL. CIVIL CODE §1709 (West 2001) providing that one who willfully deceives
another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any
damage which he thereby suffers.
252

See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 24 25.
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associated with the current laws applicable to the sports entertainment industry and
subsequently amending or reapplying them will result in attaching liability at the
appropriate level. Faced with the real threat of money damages, teams and team
physicians will provide more adequate medical treatment to professional athletes
which will ultimately result in less exploitation.
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